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The insurance crisis of the mid-1980s is over, and the insurance cycle
has turned, just as it did in 1977 following the crisis of the mid-1970s.'
Why did insurer profitability bottom out in 1984-85, leading to the dra-
matic rate increases and the refusals to write insurance that comprised the
insurance crisis of 1985-86? In their article, Sources of the Crisis in Lia-
bility Insurance: An Economic Analysis,2 Richard Clarke, Frederick
Warren-Boulton, David Smith, and Marilyn Simon ("the authors") sug-
gest that the expansion of tort law caused the crisis and reject the rele-
vance of the immunity from antitrust prosecution granted to the insurance
industry by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' The empirical evidence, how-
ever, demonstrates the opposite.
In responding to the authors' contentions, this Comment first argues
that the expansion of tort law did not cause insurance rates to rise during
1985-86. Notably, restrictions on tort law have not caused rates to fall,
and, according to the industry, they will not do so. Second, the Comment
suggests that the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity has been the
major cause of the insurance industry's cyclicality, including its periodic
"crises." This Comment criticizes the authors' failure to take three issues
into account: industry conduct indicating the existence of collusion, evi-
dence that collusive conduct protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act
f Counsel, National Insurance Consumer Organization. B.A., Oberlin College, 1973; J.D., Van-
derbilt Law School, 1978.
1. The property-casualty insurance industry, which in 1984 and 1985 had its worst two years
ever, had its best two years in 1986 and 1987. See INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, 1986 INSURER FINAN-
CIAL RESULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INDUSTRY'S RE-
COVERY 5 (1987) [hereinafter ISO REPORT]. In 1987 medical malpractice insurers had their most
profitable year since 1979, and general liability insurers had their best year since 1980. See BEST'S
INS. MGMT. REP., Release No. 48, at 8-10 (Dec. 28, 1987); Property-Casualty Insurers Report
Dramatic Income Gains, National Underwriter, Jan. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An
Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988).
3. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
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caused the insurance crisis of 1985-86, and the supra-competitive profit-
ability4 of general liability and medical malpractice insurance over the
long run. It concludes by placing the authors' arguments in historical
context.
I. The Effect of Tort Reform on Insurance Rates
During the insurance crisis of 1985-86, as during the crisis of 1975-76,
supporters of limitations on liability argued that the tort system was caus-
ing insurance rates to rise.5 A substantial body of empirical evidence,
however, demonstrates that there is no causal relationship between ex-
panding (or contracting) tort law and rising (or falling) insurance rates.
For example, under contract with the U.S. Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration, Vanderbilt University economics professor Frank Sloan
studied the medical malpractice "reforms" enacted during the mid-1970s.
During that time more than a dozen states limited medical malpractice
liability, typically by capping noneconomic damages. Using regression
analysis, Professor Sloan found that such limitations had no effect on in-
surance premiums.'
As Professor Sloan's study would suggest, the states that enacted sub-
stantial tort reform measures in the mid-1970s did not escape the insur-
ance crisis of the mid-1980s. In 1978, Pennsylvania limited the liability of
all municipalities to $500,000 per occurrence and granted absolute immu-
nity to municipalities in several classes of cases,7 thereby "stopping most
claimants who otherwise have suffered legitimate injuries dead in their
tracks." 8 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania municipalities found it no easier to
get insurance during the 1985-86 crisis than did municipalities in states
where municipal liability is unlimited.9 Municipalities in other states had
similar experiences.1
4. But see Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: A Look at
Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 501 (1988) (discussion of profitabil-
ity as inappropriate measure of insurance companies financial performance).
5. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Justice for All?, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1987, at 21, col. 1
(advertisement); Insurance Information Inst., No One is Immune From the Lawsuit Crisis, Wash.
Post, June 22, 1986, at 21, col. 1 (Magazine) (advertisement).
6. See Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance Crisis of the 197 0's: An Empirical
Assessment, 9 J. oF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 629-46 (1985).
7. Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act, 1978 Pa. Laws 1339, No. 330 (codified as amended at 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8501-8502, 8541-8542, 8545-8550, 8553, 8557-8559, 8563-8564 (Pur-
don 1982 & 1987 Supp.)).
8. See Report, Recommendations, and Summary of Testimony: Hearing on Municipal Liability
Insurance, Sept. 24, 1985, Before Pennsylvania Local Gov't Comm'n 3-4 (Nov. 1985).
9. Id.
10. In 1976, New Mexico capped municipal liability at $300,000 per person and $500,000 per
occurrence, Tort Claims Act, 1976 N.M. Laws 159 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-
4-19 (1976)) and it eliminated joint and several liability by court decision in 1982. Bartlett v. New
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The continued escalation of rates and refusals to write in states that
enacted tort reforms during the insurance crisis of the mid-1980s provides
further evidence. For example, in April 1986, the Colorado legislature
capped noneconomic damages, limited punitive damages, eliminated joint
and several liability, and eliminated the collateral source rule." Soon after
the bill was enacted, the Hartford Insurance Company, one of the nation's
largest insurers, announced that beginning in 1987 it would no longer
write medical malpractice insurance in Colorado, leading Republican leg-
islators to charge that "the insurance industry deceived the legislature
when it pushed the reforms as dealing with the liability crisis.""2
Moreover, in 1985-86 an insurance crisis occurred in some foreign ju-
risdictions which have much more restrictive tort laws than the United
States. For example, liability in the Canadian province of Ontario is much
more limited than liability in the United States. Damages for pain and
suffering are capped at $100,000 (in 1978 Canadian dollars),"3 punitive
damages are virtually unknown, 4 contingency fees are prohibited," the
losing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees,' 6 and there is
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M.
336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). Yet in 1985, New Mexico municipalities found it no easier to get insur-
ance than did municipalities in states where municipal liability is unlimited and joint and several
liability applies. See Liability Claims Down, Insurance Premiums Up, Roswell Daily Rec., May 15,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
Similarly, in 1983 the Iowa legislature substantially eliminated joint and several liability in order to
prevent the doctrine from causing cities and counties to pay large liability claims. Municipal Tort
Claims Act, 1983 Iowa Acts 70 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.4 (West 1950 &
1988 Supp.)). Yet in 1985, 41 counties had their liability insurance cancelled within a 30 day period,
leading former Iowa Senate Majority Leader Lowell Junkins, who had led the legislative fight to
eliminate joint and several liability, to change his views and begin travelling around the country
urging other state legislators not to make the same mistake. Interview with Lowell Junkins, former
Iowa Senate Majority Leader, in Orlando, Fla., (Jan. 20, 1986).
11. Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 873 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102 to -120 (1973 & 1987 Supp.)).
12. Other News From the States, LIABILITY WEEK, July 28, 1986, at 3. The insurance industry
has been extraordinarily successful at influencing legislative behavior. Perhaps most strikingly, the
West Virginia legislature passed a bill in March 1986, effective in June of the same year, that capped
damages, required insurer data disclosure, and prohibited mid-term policy cancellations. In May,
three West Virginia malpractice insurers, led by the nation's largest, St. Paul Fire and Marine, noti-
fied all West Virginia doctors that their insurance would be cancelled effective May 31. The compa-
nies claimed that the new law's insurance reform provisions were too onerous and its tort reform
provisions too weak. The legislature therefore came back into special session and weakened the insur-
ance reform provisions by requiring less financial disclosure, while strengthening the tort reform pro-
visions by restricting joint and several liability. See Cain, West Virginia Enacts Municipal Tort Re-
form Bill, Bus. Ins., June 9, 1986, at 2, col. 3; West Virginia Bill Signed Easing Curbs on Insurers,
Wall St. J., May 30, 1986, at 12, col. 3.
13. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 229, 233 (1978); ONTARIO LAW REFORM
COMM'N REPORT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 62 (1979) [hereinafter ONTARIO LAW REPORT].
14. See ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note 13, at 75; CANADIAN TORT LAW, 49-51 (A. Linden
ed. 1977).
15. See ONTARIO LAW REPORT, supra note 13, at 72, 75.
16. Id. at 72, 76.
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no constitutional right to a jury trial." Nevertheless, in 1985-86 insurers
refused to insure day care centers, school bus operators, municipalities,
and others in Ontario, just as they did in the United States."
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that tort reform has not affected
insurance rates comes from insurance companies themselves. For example,
in 1986, Florida enacted what Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the nation's
third largest insurer, characterized as "full-fledged tort reform." 9 Yet in
connection with its request for a rate increase soon after the law was en-
acted, Aetna conducted a study concluding that the Florida tort reforms
would have no effect on its rates.20 Eliminating the collateral source rule,
Aetna said, would have a negligible effect because "current Aetna claim
settlement practices recognize, in part, the existence of collateral sources
as part of the negotiating process used in arriving at a mutually satisfac-
tory damage value with the plaintiff."'" Restricting joint and several lia-
bility would not reduce insurance rates "due to the interaction of economic
damages sustained by the plaintiff, the percentage of liability assigned to
Aetna's insured, and the policy limits purchased."22 Moreover, limiting
compensation for "noneconomic" damages would not reduce insurance
17. Id. at 74, 102-04.
18. See 1 ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE, A PRE-PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1986). The Task Force found that a severe insurance crisis existed in Ontario even though "Ontario
is not 'California North'. Our tort system is different. There is no need to restrain juries because
juries are rarely used. There is no need to place legislative limits on pain and suffering awards be-
cause a $100,000 ceiling was imposed judicially in 1973. There is no need to regulate contingent fees
or reform class actions because these too do not exist." Id. at 77; see also R.A. Winter, The Liability
Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 462 (1988)
(discussing Canadian insurance crisis).
19. See Carpenter, Big Business Pushing Tort Reform, J. Com., Aug. 13, 1986, at 12A, col. 3.
20. On the basis of an analysis of 105 claims it had recently closed, Aetna estimated that the
following tort reforms would have the following effects:
Impact of Tort Law Changes
Line of Business
Products All Other
Tort Law Change Bodily Injury General Liability
Collateral Source Offset 0 (0.4%)
Joint and Several 0 0
Limitation of Noneconomic
Damages to $450,000 0 0
Punitive Damages 0 0
Future Economic Damages over
$250,000 Paid at Present Value 0 0
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Commercial Ins. Div., Bodily Injury Claim Cost Impact of Florida Tort
Law Change 1 (Aug. 8, 1986) (unpublished report on file with Fla. Ins. Dep't). For a further discus-
sion of the medical malpractice insurance market in Florida, see Blair & Makar, The Structure of
Florida's Medical Malpractice Insurance Market: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 427 (1988).
21. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., supra note 20, at 2.
22. Id.
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costs, according to Aetna, "due to the impact of degree of disability on
future losses, the impact of policy limits, and the actual settlement reached
with the plaintiff.""3 Finally, limiting punitive damages would have "no
impact" on Aetna's claims values,24 and requiring periodic payments of
future economic damages over $250,000 would yield "no net savings," be-
cause of the "interaction of policy limits, past economic losses, and future
economic losses," the "settlement value of the case," and the "apparent
implicit recognition of the periodic nature of future damages." 2 Other
insurers came to the same conclusions about the lack of a relationship
between tort reform and availability. 6
In 1986, the State of Washington enacted perhaps the most comprehen-
sive "tort reform" package in the nation, virtually eliminating joint and
several liability, limiting damages for pain and suffering to between
$117,000 and $570,000 (depending on the age of the plaintiff), and pro-
viding for periodic payment of future economic damages of more than
$100,000.2' Nevertheless, in an April 23, 1986, letter to the Washington
Insurance Department, the Great American West Company concluded
that the new law would not reduce its insurance rates and might even
raise them.28 More recently, Great American West's chairman told an
audience of insurance executives that tort reform "will not eliminate the
market dynamics that lead to insurance cycles,"2 9 and warned them that
"we must not over-promise-or even imply-that insurance cycles will
end when civil justice reform begins."3
In short, tort reform does not reduce insurance rates. Even the insur-
ance industry has abandoned the argument that expanding tort law caused
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. St. Paul Fire & Marine, for example, conducted an analysis like Aetna's and reached similar
conclusions. St. Paul found that four of the 313 closed claims it analyzed would have been affected by
the tort reforms enacted in Florida, "for a total effect of about 1% savings." St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., Medical Professional Liability, State of Florida-Addendum 1 (1986) (unpublished report
on file with Fla. Ins. Dep't). St. Paul further explained that the one percent savings estimate probably
overstated the effect of tort reform. Id.
Similarly, in October 1986, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. wrote the Kansas Insurance Depart-
ment that the same five tort reforms enacted in Florida would have a negligible effect on State Farm's
rates. State Farm emphasized that "other factors can produce an opposite effect which could equal or
outweigh any positive effect of tort reform." Letter from Robert J. Nagel, Assistant Vice Pres., State
Filings Div. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., to Ray Rathert, Kan. Ins. Dep't (Oct. 21, 1986) (on
file with author).
27. Tort Reform Act, 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, §§ 301, 402, 801 (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.030-4.22.070, 4.56.250, 4.56.260 (1962 & 1988 Supp.)).
28. Letter from Kevin J. Kelley, Director of Actuarial, Great American West, Inc., to Norman
Figon, Rate Analyst, Washington Ins. Dep't (Apr. 23, 1986) (on file with author).
29. Don't Link Rates to Tort Reform, Insurance Executive Warns Peers, LIABILITY WEEK, Jan.
19, 1988, at 1.
30. Id.
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the insurance crisis of 1985-86."' The authors' continued reliance on that
argument is unconvincing.
II. The Effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Antitrust Exemption on In-
surance Rates
The preceding Part tried to show that the state of tort law was not a
substantial contributing factor to the dramatic insurance rate increases
and refusals to write that occurred in 1985-86. This Part contends that
the real culprit is the antitrust exemption enjoyed by the insurance
industry.
The authors argue that property-casualty insurance is competitively
structured, and that insurers therefore cannot possibly collude, regardless
of the antitrust exemption permitting them to do so. But they do not ex-
amine the conduct of the industry to determine whether insurance compa-
nies have in fact been colluding. By examining the industry's conduct, this
Part demonstrates first that collusion exists in the property-casualty insur-
ance industry, and then that this collusion caused the crisis. It argues that
the repeal of the antitrust exemption will eliminate, or at least ameliorate,
future crises. Finally, this Part examines the profitability of property-
casualty insurance as a whole and, more specifically, the profitability of
the two types of insurance that rose so dramatically in price during the
1985-86 "crisis"-medical malpractice and general liability. While the
authors are generally correct in concluding that the property-casualty in-
dustry is competitively structured, the supra-competitive profits that medi-
cal malpractice and general liability insurers consistently earn is further
evidence that collusion has in fact occurred in those segments of the indus-
try, and that repeal of the antitrust exemption is likely to reduce profits
and prices in those segments of the industry to competitive levels.
A. Conduct of Property-Casualty Insurers
Although the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption permits price
fixing, market division, tying arrangements, and other anticompetitive ac-
tivities in the insurance industry, it does not allow boycotts-collective re-
fusals to write insurance at any price. The leading case is St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,"2 in which the Supreme Court held that
an agreement by four malpractice insurers not to write such insurance
31. Insurers Shy Away From Linking Rates to Tort Crisis, LIABILITY WEEK, Dec. 21, 1987, at
1.
32. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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during the 1974-75 malpractice crisis fell within the boycott exception to
McCarran-Ferguson and thus violated the Sherman Act.
Similarly, in April 1986, during the most recent crisis, the three major
West Virginia malpractice insurers sent notices to all their policyholders
cancelling their insurance, effective May 31, 1987, in an effort to pressure
the legislature to repeal insurance disclosure legislation scheduled to take
effect June 6. After the state attorney general filed suit for boycott, the
court enjoined the cancellations."3 In 1986, Colorado day care centers sued
insurers, alleging boycotts.3 4 In March 1988, eight state attorneys general
filed the largest insurance industry boycott case ever against approxi-
mately thirty insurance industry defendants.3 ' The plaintiffs charge that
the 1985-86 insurance crisis was caused by an agreement among four
major insurance companies, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), and the
major international reinsurance companies not to write certain types of
insurance at any price. 6 Among the documents cited in the complaint is
one signed by more than forty-three reinsurers entitled "Non-Marine
London Market Agreement 1987," in which the signatories agreed not to
write pollution coverage. 7 At the same time, a separate boycott case was
filed by the Texas Attorney General. Texas alleged that during the insur-
ance crisis, Aetna and other major insurance companies had agreed not to
write certain types of "politically sensitive" insurance in order to pressure
state legislators to enact tort reform.3 8 Finding a "smoking gun" agree-
ment not to underwrite insurance, however, is rather unusual. Price fixing
is the more common situation. Yet, because of the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption, courts have been forced to dismiss cases involving either price
33. West Virginia ex. rel. Brown v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Civ. No. 86-C-1400,
Kanawha Cry. Circ. Ct. (W. Va., filed Apr. 14, 1986); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
34. Pankratz, Day Care Centers File Insurance Suit, Denver Post, Jan. 17, 1986, at B1, col. 2.
35. California v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0981 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1988);
New York v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0983 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Massa-
chusetts v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0984 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Minne-
sota v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0985 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); West Vir-
ginia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0986 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Wisconsin v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0987 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Alabama v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0988 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Arizona v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., Civ. 88-1009 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 23, 1988). These cases are pending in federal court
in the Northern District of California. Status conference was to be held on June 24, 1988. Consolida-
tion of the individual cases for discovery purposes is under discussion.
36. See Eight States Sue U.S.,British Insurers, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1988, at BI, col. 5.
37. Complaint at 35, 11 107, West Virginia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0986 WWS (N.D.
Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1988).
38. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 33-6, State v. Insurance Servs. Office, Inc., No. 439,089 (Tex.
53d Dist. filed Mar. 22, 1988).
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fixing"9 or any other type of collusion falling short of a complete refusal to
deal on any terms. 0
B. The ISO Rate
The most pervasive collusion in the property-casualty insurance indus-
try is the promulgation of rates by industry-owned and industry-operated
"rate bureaus." Until the mid-1960s, rate bureaus typically required each
of their members to adhere to the rates that they promulgated. 1 The rate
bureau that issues workers compensation insurance rates, the National
Council on Compensation Insurance, still substantially retains this "ad-
herence" requirement.' 2 In contrast, the ISO, the rate bureau that
promulgates general liability, automobile, and homeowners policy rates,
no longer expressly requires its members to adhere to its rates. Instead the
ISO issues "advisory" rates.4 Absent the McCarran-Ferguson immunity,
the issuance of these advisory rates would almost certainly be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Courts have consistently prohibited trade
associations from circulating "suggested" price lists,"" even when the list
serves only as a starting point for price determination,"5 or when no
agreement to adhere to the "suggested" price exists and prices do substan-
tially depart from the "suggested" rate." The ISO determines the pro-
spective advisory rate by collecting and compiling past cost data on com-
panies' payments of claims or amounts reserved for reported claims. Past
39. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Steingart v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 366 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ohio AFL-CIO v.
Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971); Fleming v. Travelers Indem. Co., 324 F.Supp.
1404 (D. Mass. 1971); SEC v. National Sec. 393 U.S. 453 (1969); California League of Indep. Ins.
Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
40. See, e.g., Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984) (redlining); Dexter
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975) (tying arrangement); Lawyers Title
Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 526 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975) (predatory pricing); Grant v. Erie Ins.
Exch., 542 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (conspiracy to deny benefits).
41. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, RATES AND RATING ORGANIZATIONS (Fl), SUBCOMM.
REPORT, Dec. 2 1968, at 4-5, quoted in STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST Now
IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION, REPORT TO GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER,
137 (Jan. 7, 1969) ("The requirement that member companies of Bureaus must adhere to bureau
rates is being relaxed; member companies can treat the rates as advisory and may deviate from them
without permission.").
42. National Council on Compensation Insurance, Const. art. VII, § (3)(c) (1985) (on file with
author).
43. For an explanation of the use of advisory rates from an insurance industry perspective, see
Lefkin, Shattering Some Myths on the Insurance Liability Crisis: A Comment on the Article by
Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Simon, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 419-20 (1988).
44. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 862 (1962).
45. Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
46. United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan.), aff d per
curiam, 355 U.S. 10 (1957); see generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING
OF INSURANCE 167-70 (1977).
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cost data must then be "developed" and "trended" through the application
of a "loss development factor" and a "trend factor." Advisory rates are
based on "incurred losses," estimates of the amount an insurer will even-
tually pay out on policies in effect in a given year. The estimates are
calculated by multiplying the amount that has actually been paid out and
reserved over a certain period for claims covered by these policies by the
"loss development" factor. The loss development factor is based on the
pattern of payouts over time on prior years' policies. In determining the
rates to be charged in future years, the ISO multiplies the developed in-
curred loss estimates for past years (actual payouts and reserves for a cer-
tain period times the loss development factor) by a "trend factor." The
trend factor is an estimate of such effects as (a) monetary inflation, (b)
"social inflation," (c) increases in the size of jury verdict amounts, and (d)
increases in the rate of case filings. By using the ISO's judgment with
respect to these factors instead of each individual insurance company's, the
current McCarran-Ferguson-protected rate making regime remains an-
ticompetitive."7 Moreover, in order to arrive at a fixed "advisory" rate, the
ISO supplements the developed and trended loss data with additional
amounts for "loss adjustment expenses" (mainly legal defense fees), "total
production cost allowance" (agents' commissions and expenses), "general
expenses," "taxes, licenses, and fees," and "underwriting profit and con-
tingencies."' 8 Only forty percent of the ISO advisory product liability rate
is actually paid in indemnity; fourteen percent goes for defense lawyers'
fees and other loss adjustment expenses,"' twenty-five percent goes for "to-
tal production cost allowance," thirteen percent goes for general expenses,
three percent for taxes, licenses and fees, and five percent for underwriting
profit and contingencies. 50
Most companies, however, have substantially lower expenses than those
included in the ISO "advisory" rate."' Thus, by issuing an "advisory"
47. For a more detailed explanation of the loss development and trend process, see U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB. & ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, REPORT ON PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE RATEMAKING 100 (1980).
48. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., Ohio Dep't of Ins. Filing GL86 TPRDI at Sec-
tion D, Exhibit 5 (Feb. 21, 1986).
49. Fifty-four cents of each product liability premium dollar is allocated to loss and loss adjust-
ment expense. In 1984, insurers allocated 36 cents for legal defense expenses for each dollar they paid
or reserved in indemnity, up from 25 cents in 1970. Of the 54 cents of the product liability premium
dollar allocated to loss and loss adjustment expense, therefore, 40 cents (54+ 1.36) is paid to injured
people and 14 cents is paid to defense lawyers and for other loss adjustment expenses. INSURANCE
SERVS. OFFICE, INC., THE RISING COSTS OF GENERAL LIABILITY LEGAL DEFENSE, 2 (1986).
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE TASK FORCE ON PROD. LIAB. & ACCIDENT COMPENSATION,
supra note 47.
51. Compare ISO Medical Malpractice Filing No. GL-87-BHOSI at Exhibit 3 (Dec. 22, 1987)
with A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 153 (1987) (ISO
allocates 15% of premium dollar to total production cost allowance while actual industry-wide average
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rate that includes expense factors based on those of the least efficient in-
surers and a profit factor which, among other things, ignores investment
income, the ISO both protects inefficient carriers and enables the more
efficient carriers to earn supra-competitive profits.
In summary, the ISO not only develops and trends loss data, but fur-
ther adds to this loss data figure allowances for various expenses, profits,
and "contingencies." Rather than develop their own loss data figures, in-
dividual companies use the figures provided by the ISO and are thereby
not genuinely competing. Accordingly the insurance market is not a free
market. As the Supreme Court stated, "[g]enuine competitors . . . do not
submit the details of their business to the analysis of an expert, jointly
employed, and obtain from him a 'harmonized' estimate of the market as
it is and as, in his specially and confidentially informed judgment, it
promises to be."'5' Absent the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, both the
individual "competitors" engaging in such an outside analysis and the ex-
pert executing it, the ISO, would be in violation of the antitrust laws.
III. How the Protected ISO Rate Causes Periodic Insurance Crises
The ISO rate is largely responsible for the cyclical nature of the insur-
ance industry,53 and in particular for periodic insurance crises like the one
that occurred in 1985-86. To be sure, fluctuations in interest rates, stock
prices, and exchange rates, and the inelasticity of demand for insurance,
have contributed to the cycle."' But it is the industry's antitrust exemption
that makes the peaks and valleys so extreme. The most apparent effect of
McCarran-Ferguson is the sudden, dramatic increase in insurance rates
that occurs at the bottom of each cycle. In January 1985, the ISO appar-
ently decided that the price cutting of the last few years had gone far
enough; ISO President Daniel McNamara called a joint industry confer-
ence with the Insurance Information Institute, the industry's public rela-
tions arm, where he emphasized that "the need for significant premium
is 6.4%, sum of ratios to premium written in categories of "commissions and brokerage incurred" and
"other acquisitions incurred").
52. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921).
53. Many insurance executives see the insurance cycle as inevitable. Property-Casualty Executives
Speak Out, BEST'S REV.: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INS. EDITION, July 1985, at 18. For example,
Aetna's President, William 0. Bailey, observed that "the cyclicality that is ingrained in the business
will not disappear." Id. U.S.F. & G.'s President, Paul Scheel, believed that "the property-casualty
industry always will be cyclical." Id. at 22. Cincinnati Insurance Co.'s President, Robert B. Morgan,
concluded that "[t]here is not a chance that underwriting stability-over a period of years-is feasi-
ble." Id. at 19.
During the 50 years prior to 1984, insurance cycles have lasted from four to 11 years. Wall Street
Analyst's Report Disputes Consumerist Allegations, BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., Release No. 29, Aug.
11, 1986, at 1. (Statement of Salomon Brothers Managing Director Michael Frinquelli).
54. Id.
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increases, especially for commercial lines, is absolute for the next three
years."515 Then, in May 1985, the ISO distributed throughout the industry
a major position paper, entitled 1985: A Critical Year, which proclaimed
that "the brutal price war of the last six years is over," and that "signifi-
cant premium increases are needed, especially for the current commercial
lines products."" Suddenly, in the summer of 1985, insurance companies
that only a few months earlier had been competing on price and ignoring
the ISO "advisory" rate were tripling and quadrupling their premiums,
returning to the ISO rate. 7 Yet equally important is the effect of
McCarran-Ferguson on insurance company pricing at the peaks of the
insurance cycle. Since insurance companies know that McCarran-
Ferguson allows them to get together to halt price cutting and suddenly
raise their prices in concert, they engage in price cutting during periods of
high interest rates. Thus McCarran-Ferguson allows them to get back in
one year what they gave away in six.58
The children's game of tag provides an instructive analogy. The
McCarran-protected bureau rate functions as "home base." During the
competitive phase of the cycle, insurers' price cuts are deeper and the du-
ration of their price cutting longer than would be the case in a free market
because the price cutters know they can always return to the home base of
the bureau rate. Because the rate is set at a level at which the least effi-
cient bureau member is profitable, it allows most insurers to earn excess
profits. These excess profits attract significant capital, which sets the stage
for the price-cutting to begin again.
The existence of the ISO "advisory" rate also leads companies to moni-
tor their costs inadequately. Rather than set their prices on the basis of
their own costs and a reasonable profit, they use the ISO rate as a bench-
mark-even though each individual insurer has a mix of business differ-
ent from that of the average insurer, so that each insurer's loss experience
and payout patterns differ from the average. If the ISO were prohibited
from issuing an advisory rate-if there were no benchmark-companies
would be forced to monitor their costs more carefully and to set their
prices on the basis of those costs. As long as the ISO issues an "advisory"
55. Bradford, PropertylCasualty Shortfall May Total $62 Billion Over Three Years, ISO Says,
Bus. Ins., Feb. 4, 1985, at 16, col. 2.
56. INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE & NAT'L ASS'N OF iNDEP. INSURERS, 1985: A CRITICAL YEAR 5
(1985).
57. Bingman, Special Risks and 1985-1986 Market Capacity, National Underwriter, Sept. 6,
1985, at 82, col. 1 ("[The quick reversal in underwriting standards has been shocking ...[In the
area of general liability, wihat has occurred however, is a return to basic ISO rating subject to a
minimum 20% surcharge.").
58. But see R.A. Winter, supra note 18, at 497-98 (prohibition against information sharing
would exacerbate problems, making market more cyclical and forcing smaller firms out of market).
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rate, the effect of mistakes in judgment about loss development or trend
factors, or of deliberate attempts to inflate losses to pressure legislatures to
enact tort reform, is magnified. In contrast, as an independent actuary
recently explained to the House Judiciary Committee, "[w]ith the elimi-
nation of Bureau rates as a standard, companies would develop their own
rate structure. These rates may not all necessarily move in the same direc-
tion, depending on each individual company's book of business. Thus, rate
'swings' would tend to be ameliorated."59
IV. The Profitability of Property-Casualty Insurance Markets
Property-casualty insurance is divided into "lines," subcategories of
lines called "sublines," and subcategories of sublines called "classes." For
example, general liability is a line and is made up of three sublines: prod-
ucts and completed operations liability; manufacturers' and contractors'
liability; and owners', landlords', and tenants' liability. Each of these sub-
lines is made up of hundreds of classes-such as day nursery liability,
sporting goods manufacturing, and pharmaceutical manufacturing."0
These categories are established by the ISO. The kinds of insurance for
which insurers sharply raised prices in 1985-86, such as liquor liability,
recreational liability, and political subdivision liability, typically include
several different classes as defined by the ISO.6"
Measuring the true profitability of both property-casualty insurance in
general and of specific categories of property-casualty insurance is difficult
for two reasons. First, property-casualty insurance companies do not use
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); instead, they use more
conservative accounting principles adopted by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (so-called statutory accounting principles).6 2
These principles consistently understate profitability in two ways. First,
statutory accounting principles allow a company to deduct immediately
the full amount it estimates it will pay out on policies currently in effect,
even if those payments will not actually be made for many years, thereby
ignoring the time value of money. Second, statutory accounting principles
allow insurers to deduct immediately business expenses associated with
59. BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., Release No. 43, Dec. 14, 1987; Hearings Before the House Judici-
ary Comm., Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (unpub-
lished) (Statement of James S. Stergiou).
60. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL STATISTICAL PLAN-PRODUCTS/
COMPLETED OPERATIONS LIABILITY PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION CODES, 176-187.2 (list of hundreds
of classifications, from "Abrasive Paper or Cloth Preparation" (code 32908) to "Zinc Products Mfg."
(code 34904)).
61. See ISO REPORT, supra note 1.
62. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER CHANGING FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY iii (1985).
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the sale and renewal of insurance policies regardless of the life of the
policy, rather than requiring allocation of those expenses to match the
associated premium revenues. These two conventions substantially under-
state profitability.63
The second difficulty in measuring property-casualty industry profit-
ability is the impossibility of determining at the time policies are written
the amount that will ultimately be paid out on those policies. The ulti-
mate payout must therefore be estimated. Even using the most up-to-date
methods and assuming the utmost good faith on the part of insurers, these
estimates are necessarily inaccurate and have proved in the past to be sub-
stantially overstated, thus understating profitability. A 1986 study, for ex-
ample, calculated that the one hundred largest property-casualty insur-
ance companies had on average overestimated the amount they would pay
on policies in force in 1984 by twenty-one percent."' Of course, if insurers
make their estimates in less than good faith-if, for example, they deliber-
ately inflate their reserves in connection with their campaign for tort re-
form-these estimates are even more likely to be inaccurate.65 In July
1987, the U.S. General Accounting Office studied the profitability of med-
ical malpractice and general liability insurance and found that if the time
value of money is taken into account, insurers earned a return on premi-
ums of 15.3%, which, based on the standard 2:1 premium-to-surplus ratio,
translates into a rate of return on surplus of 30.6%.6 Similarly, the GAO
63. Id.; see also Lacey, supra note 4, at 504-05.
64. BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., Release No. 15, Apr. 7, 1986.
65. The authors measure changes over time, not in the amount insurers actually pay out on a
given year's policies, but rather changes over time in the amount insurers estimate that they will
eventually pay out on a given year's policies. They conclude, quite accurately, that insurers' estimates
of how much they will pay out in the future were higher during the period 1981-85 than they were
in the period 1967-80. The increase in estimates of future payouts could mean, as the authors hypoth-
esize, that actual payouts have increased. On the other hand, it could also mean that insurers are
deliberately inflating their estimates to support their campaign for tort reform. While the authors
prefer the first explanation, they offer us no reason to choose it over the second one.
Similarly, the authors correctly conclude that insurers' estimates of future payouts were more varia-
ble in the period 1981-85 than in the period 1967-80. They hypothesize that greater variability
during the period 1981-85 means that tort law had become more uncertain during that period. On the
other hand, it can also mean that insurers are deliberately manipulating their reserves-for example,
increasing their reserves in order to bolster their campaign for tort reform, or reducing them in order
to increase their surplus. Because the greater the industry's surplus, the more premium it can write,
insurers have an incentive to understate their reserves when interest rates are high, and thus to char-
acterize more of their money as surplus and write more premiums which can then be invested at high
interest rates,
That incentive is particularly strong with respect to the so-called "long-tail" lines, such as general
liability and medical malpractice, where a large percentage of claims are not paid until many years
after the premium has been paid, during which time the premium is invested. We would therefore
expect loss ratios for these lines to be highly variable-to be higher when interest rates are high,
yielding sufficient investment income to offset a substantial underwriting loss, and lower when interest
rates and investment income is low, and thus unable to offset a substantial underwriting loss.
66. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSURANCE: PROFITABILITY OF THE MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE AND GENERAL LIABILITY LINES 25 (1987). The funds insurance companies hold in addition to
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found that insurers earned 13.4% on premiums on general liability insur-
ance, which translates into a 26.8% return on surplus.17 During the same
eleven year period the all-industry average rate of return on net worth
was 13.2%."' Thus, both general liability insurers and medical malprac-
tice insurers have earned returns of more than 200% of the all-industry
average over the last decade.6 In 1986 and 1987, medical malpractice and
general liability insurers continued to do well. In 1987, for example, med-
ical malpractice insurers had their most profitable year since 1979, and
their estimates of how much they would pay out in the future, their so-
called "incurred losses," increased by only 1.2%, while loss adjustment
expenses, mostly defense lawyers' fees, actually decreased by 1.6%."o Ac-
cording to Best's, the reporting service for the property-casualty industry,
"the outgo factors have stabilized at almost a no-growth level "for medical
malpractice insurance" and "the stabilizing trend of losses and expenses
bodes well for this line in the future. 1 Similarly, in both 1986 and 1987
general liability insurers were more profitable than they had been in any
year since 1980.72
Insurers who write certain subcategories of general liability insurance
have also been consistently earning excessive profits in recent years. Al-
though insurers have not traditionally been required to disclose their pre-
miums and losses for such subcategories, in 1986 and 1987 several states
enacted statutes requiring such disclosure.7 In the states for which data
are available, the loss ratios for both day care liability and liquor liability
the amount they estimate they will pay out in future claims are called surplus. Although they invest
both the funds they have received to pay future claims and the funds they hold as surplus, they carry
the former on their books as a liability, as so-called "loss reserves." Surplus, in contrast, is an asset
and corresponds to net worth in other industries. Insurers typically write two dollars of premium for
each dollar they hold in surplus. BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., Release No. 30, Oct. 13, 1986, at 3. An
insurer's return on surplus-in effect, its return on net worth-is therefore approximately double its
return on premium.
67. Id. at 30.
68. INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., INSURANCE FACTS: 1986-87 PROPERTY-CASUALTY FACT
BOOK 22 (1988); INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., INSURANCE FACTS: 1985-86 PROPERTY-
CASUALTY FACT BOOK 22 (1987).
69. Property-casualty insurers also far outperformed the general stock market during the late
1970s and early 1980s. For example, on December 31, 1977 Best's property-casualty stock index
stood at 156.10, compared to 624.33 on December 31, 1985, for a gain of 300%. During the same
period, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose by 86%, from 831.17 to 1546.67. BEST'S INS. MGMT.
REP., Release No. 3, Jan. 25, 1988. Thus, property-casualty stocks rose more than three times as
much as the stock market as a whole.
70. BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., supra note 1, at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 8-9.
73. In 1986, 18 states enacted statutes requiring insurance companies to disclose previously undis-
closed data. Most statutes called for the disclosure of premium and losses on several subcategories of
general liablity insurance, typically including day care liablity. See STATISTICAL INFORMATION AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NAIC LEGAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (D) TASK FORCE, app. B at i
(Dec. 1986).
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are consistently well under 100% and have declined over time, demon-
strating that those types of insurance are extremely profitable and have
become more profitable over time.74 The question then arises: if medical
malpractice and general liability insurance are so profitable, then why are
new companies not entering those markets and bidding away those prof-
its? The authors are generally correct in concluding that the property-
casualty industry is structured competitively, and that it would be a rela-
tively simple matter for any insurance company writing any type of
property-casualty insurance to write any other type of property-casualty
insurance. To be sure, an insurer must meet the capital and surplus re-
quirements of each state in which it wishes to do business, and somewhat
different knowledge may be necessary to write medical malpractice, for
example, than to write pollution liability. Yet the capital and surplus re-
quirements of the different states are relatively nominal," and the special-
ized expertise which insurers say they possess seems more illusory than
real.76
On the other hand, significant entry barriers have traditionally kept the
two most likely potential entrants out of the insurance business: banks and
insureds. Both federal and state laws, for example, continue to prevent
banks and other financial institutions from entering insurance.77 And
groups of commercial risks who wish to band together to set up their own
insurance company have traditionally been prohibited from doing so since
they have had to comply with the multiple, and often conflicting, capital,
surplus, and other legal requirements of each state in which any group
74. For example, the loss ratios for day care liability in New York were 0.657 in 1981, 0.377 in
1982, 0.554 in 1983, 0.690 in 1984, and 0.394 in 1985, based on the data insurers submitted pursuant
to New York's new disclosure statute. STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEP'T, ANNUAL COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY-CASUALTY REPORT 14, 36 (Jan. 1, 1988). It is important to keep in mind that a loss ratio
of 0.394 in 1985 does not mean that insurers pay out 39 cents in 1985 for each dollar they receive in
premiums that year, but rather that they estimate they will eventually pay out 39 cents for each dollar
they earn in premiums in 1985. Between 1985 and the time they eventually pay the claims, which for
day care is typically between three and five years, the premiums they have received earned interest.
The loss ratio is calculated by dividing incurred losses by earned premium. Because the loss ratio does
not include investment income, an insurer can have a loss ratio of over 100%, particularly in the long-
tail line, and still be highly profitable. Id. at 33. In addition, their 39 cent estimate is likely to be
inaccurate and, according to Best's, likely to be overstated. Insurance yielding a .394 loss ratio is
therefore extraordinarily profitable.
75. Capital and surplus requirements can be as low as $400,000. See INSURANCE INFORMATION
INST., BASIC CONCEPTS OF ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANIES 33 (1984) (citing capital and surplus requirements in Pennsylvania); see also Blair &
Makar, supra note 20, at 442-46 (arguing that insurance companies can easily change the liabilities
they insure).
76. See St. Paul's Heresy, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1987, at 151-53; Property-Casualty
Executives Speak Out, supra note 53.
77. See Banks as Insurance Agencies: Legal Constraints and Competitive Advances, NEW ENG-
LAND ECON. REV. Sept./Oct. 1985, at 34.
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member is located."8 In October 1986, however, Congress enacted the Lia-
bility Risk Retention Act of 1986, which enables commercial risks to form
their own insurance companies, called risk retention groups, by complying
only with the legal requirements of the state in which the group was li-
censed.79 This reform has made the formation of such groups significantly
easier. The state insurance commissioners, however, have been hostile to-
ward the groups; commissioners have sought to shut groups down that do
business in their states without state licenses.8" The full procompetitive
effects of the groups, therefore, have yet to be realized.
In addition, the premium-to-surplus ratio makes it necessary for insur-
ers to have substantially more cash surplus than what is expressly re-
quired by state law in order to expand into additional lines. Moreover,
when insurers sharply raise their prices the 2:1 premium-to-surplus ratio
prevents them from writing as much insurance as consumers demand.
This artificial restriction of supply forces prices even higher. Assume, for
example, that in 1984 insurer A, writing at a 2:1 premium-to-surplus
ratio, has $100 in surplus and insures two risks for $100 each. He then
doubles his rates, so that he now must charge each of those two risks $200
for the same coverage. However, in order to maintain a 2:1 premium-to-
surplus ratio he must drop one of the risks-even if it is profitable.
Perhaps the biggest reason for the absence of new entries during the
1985-86 crisis, however, is what the Insurance Information Institute (III)
trumpeted as its "effort to market the idea that there is something wrong
with the civil justice system in the United States," which it launched in
December 1984.81 Pursuant to this effort, insurance company and trade
association executives encouraged others in the industry to refrain from
writing certain types of insurance-whether or not they were profita-
ble-in order to pressure legislatures to enact tort reform.82 In June 1985,
for example, former GEICO Chairman John J. Byrne told the Casualty
Actuaries of New York that they should quit covering doctors, chemical
78. See S. REP. No. 294, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 865, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
8-9 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 190, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1981).
79. Pub. L. No. 99-563, 100 Stat. 5177 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3903,
3905, 3906 (Supp. 1986)).
80. See, e.g., Geisel, Risk Retention Group Says Kentucky Violated 1986 Act, Bus. Ins., Feb. 29,
1988, at 2, col. 2. (" 'AIF is being denied the right to furnish a form of insurance coverage in Ken-
tucky simply because it is a risk retention group,' American Interfidelity Exchange's complaint al-
leges."); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LIABILITY RISK RETENTION ACT OF 1986: IMPLEMENTATION
REPORT (Sept. 1987); Give It A Chance, National Underwriter, Nov. 9, 1987, at 22, col. 2 (editorial
citing state insurance commissioners' hostility to risk retention groups).
81. Maher, I.1.1. Launches New Ad Campaign, National Underwriter, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col.
1.
82. Accord State v. Insurance Servs. Office, Inc., No. 439,089 (Tex. 53d Dist. filed Mar. 22,
1988); see also West Virginia v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0986 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed Mar.
22, 1988); Eight States Sue U.S.,British Insurers, supra note 36 (article citing case).
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manufacturers, and corporate officers and directors since "[i]t is right for
the industry to withdraw and let the pressure for reform build in the
courts and in the state legislatures.''8
A few months later, in November 1985, the III sent a "kit" on the
"civil justice crisis" to insurance executives and agents urging them to tell
their policyholders and the media that "insurers have no recourse but to
cut back on liability insurance until improvements in the civil justice sys-
tem will create a fairer distribution of liability, reduce the number of law-
suits, and create a climate in which insurance can operate more predict-
ably." '8 4 Then, in January 1986, the III announced a new $6.5 million
television and magazine advertisement campaign targeted at twelve states
in which it was seeking tort reform designed, in the III's words, "to
change the widely held perception that there is an 'insurance crisis' to a
perception of a 'lawsuit crisis'."8 The advertisements featured polio vic-
tims, mothers, ministers, and high school athletes explaining that "doctors
are afraid to deliver babies, clergy are becoming reluctant to counsel their
congregations, and high schools are thinking about closing down their
sports programs" because of the "lawsuit crisis."8 6 The magazine adver-
tisements ran in the New York Times and the Washington Post,8" among
other newspapers. NBC, the only network to run the advertisements, in-
sisted that they be substantially changed after a citizen group charged that
they were deceptive.8 8 Individual insurance companies and insurance bro-
kerages also ran their own advertisements carrying similar messages.8 9
In short, with the III and the ISO campaigning for tort reform on the
grounds that the dramatic increases of 1985-86 in general liability and
medical malpractice rates were the result of a "lawsuit crisis," it would
hardly add to the insurance industry's credibility if incumbent insurance
companies were suddenly to begin writing medical malpractice or general
liability insurance in the midst of that crisis. That would seem to be the
most important reason incumbent insurers did not begin writing the his-
83. J. Com., June 18, 1985, at 10A, col. 1.
84. INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., OUTLINE FOR SPEECH: CRISIS IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM 7 (Nov. 11, 1985) (attachment to Memorandum from Mechlin D. Moore, President, Insurance
Information Institute, to State Presidents and Senior Staff Executives of the Professional Insurance
Agents).
85. Tort Reform Drive Launched, J. Com., March 19, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
86. See id.; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., supra note 5.
87. See supra note 5.
88. See Howard, NBC Decides Not to Air .LL Tort Reform Ads Pending Further Review, Na-
tional Underwriter, Apr. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 3; see also Tort Reform Drive Launched, J. Com., Mar.
19, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
89. See American International Group, There's a Price to Be Paid for Excessive Liability Awards
in Our Courts, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1985, at A16, col. 1.
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torically profitable general liability and medical malpractice lines during
the most recent trough in the insurance cycle.
Conclusion
While the authors theorize that changes in tort law caused insurance
rates to skyrocket and insurers to withdraw from certain markets, the em-
pirical evidence rebuts their view. The insurance industry itself has pub-
lished studies demonstrating that limitations on liability will not reduce
insurance rates. For the authors to claim that expanding tort liability has
raised insurance rates is unconvincing.
The authors' insistence on the benign nature of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which permits insurers to fix prices and engage in other
anticompetitive practices that would be punishable in any other industry
by three years imprisonment and a one million dollar fine, is also quite
troublesome. While there is disagreement in antitrust circles about the
proper scope of the antitrust laws, there has heretofore been unanimous
agreement that horizontal restraints, such as price fixing, harm consum-
ers, and exemptions from the antitrust laws are unjustifiable for any
industry.
The authors fail to come to grips not only with the evidence of collusion
established in the records of antitrust cases filed during the two most re-
cent insurance crises, but also with the protected anticompetitive activities
in which the insurer-owned and insurer-operated Insurance Services Of-
fice has long engaged. The ISO is legally permitted to issue "advisory
rates" on behalf of the industry. Yet, since these advisory rates are based
on the costs of the least efficient carriers and on the ISO's judgment as to
the extent to which claims are likely to escalate in the future, an overesti-
mate by the ISO-innocent or otherwise-as to the level of future claims
can sharply and unjustly raise insurance prices across the industry.
The authors have also chosen to ignore the extraordinary public rela-
tions campaign mounted by the insurance industry to "market the idea
that there is something wrong with the civil justice system in the United
States," as the III puts it.9" The industry has a right, of course, to seek to
manipulate public opinion in any way it desires, at any cost it can afford,
by any legal means. No sound analysis of the recent insurance crisis, how-
ever, can disregard that manipulation.
Finally, the authors do not acknowledge the long-term profitability of
general liability and medical malpractice insurance, as documented by the
GAO, and the unprecedented profitability of the property-casualty indus-
90. See Maher supra note 81.
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try in 1986-87. The collusive benefits granted to the insurance industry
by the McCarran-Ferguson exemption help to explain both the long-term
profitability of the industry and the record profitability of the industry
following the "crisis" years of 1984 and 1985. The state of tort law does
not.

